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CURRENT DATA ON THE INDONESIAN MILITARY ELITE
(Prepared by the Editors)
Periodically over the last fifteen years we have prepared lists of officers hold­
ing key positions in the hierarchy of the Indonesian Armed Forced to help readers 
keep abreast of current developments. (The last previous listing was in Indonesia, 
No. 33 [April 1982] which included changes through February 1982.) We have been 
able to do so because changes of personnel have typically been incremental, and 
because when a major organizational change took place, as in October 1969, the 
transformation occurred quickly and smoothly, without involving any drastic redis­
tribution of power or personnel. This is not the case with the recent reorganiza­
tion. The changes that got under practical way in March 1983 are unprecedented 
in their scope and complexity, and seem unlikely to run their full course before 
well into 1984. Essentially, they can be understood as involving two distinct, yet 
interrelated processes: (1) a generational shift which has virtually eliminated the 
"Generation of '45" from the Armed Forces' hierarchy; (2) the organizational rever­
berations of the separation of the functions of Minister of Defense and Security and 
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces mandated by Law 20/1982. Perhaps fortu­
nately for the editors, the evidence for the generational shift was largely complete 
as of the beginning of July 1983, and seems reasonably susceptible to preliminary 
analysis. On the other hand, although General S. Poniman and General L. B. 
"Benny" Murdani assumed on March 28, 1983 the twin top positions that had earlier 
always been held by a single officer, the division of authority and responsibility 
between them has yet to be resolved; and until it is resolved many billets remain 
either empty or held on a caretaker basis. Accordingly, we have decided to focus 
attention in this issue primarily on the generational shift and the massive rotation 
of officers in command positions. We hope to follow up, in our next issue, with a 
description and analysis of the major organizational transformation now under way, 
and the new pattern of staff appointments.
* -k *
The three months March, April, and May 1983 saw more, and more dramatic, 
personnel changes in the military elite than at any other time since the overthrow 
of Guided Democracy in 1965-66 (see Table A ), more than the total number of 
changes for the years 1981 and 1982 combined. Between December 1982 and June 
1983 forty-seven offices acquired new holders. These included the Minister of De­
fense; the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces; the Commander of Kopkamtib; 
all four Service Chiefs; the Deputy Army Chief of Staff and all six of his assistants; 
the Commander of the Army Strategic Reserve (Kostrad); three out of four Regional 
Defense Commanders (Pangkowilhan); fifteen out of sixteen Territorial Commanders 
(Pangdam); and the leaderships of all key educational institutions.
The underlying meaning of these massive changes is a seismic generational shift 
within the military, and especially the Army, hierarchy. This shift, in turn, is the 
product of the "crossing" of two quite distinct factors: (a) the peculiar "manpower
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TABLE A
Changes of Holders of Listed Positions* 
from March 1982 through June 1983
1982 1983
January 0
February 1
Ma rch 0 6 (7?)f
April 0 6
May 0 23
June 1 2
July 0
August 0
September 0
October 0
November 0
December 8
Total 9 39
* Total number of positions = 77: 48 of the 77 changed, 
36 of them within 3 months.
f  The Chief of the Operations Staff was replaced be­
tween December 1982 and March 1983, but the actual 
date of this change is not known.
Out of 50 "key" jobs, 39 were changed. This included 
all Kodams, 3 of 4 Kowilhans, all four Heads of Ser­
vices, KKO and Kopassandha, all Educational Centers, 
Kostrad and National Strategic Command, all Deputy 
and Assistants to KSAD.
history" of the Indonesian Armed Forces; and (b) the military's long-standing, 
self-imposed rule—broken only under exceptional circumstances—that no officer 
may remain on active service after reaching the age of 56.
During the four years (1945-49) in which the infant Republic of Indonesia 
fought against a returning Dutch colonialism, the revolutionaries attempted to com­
pensate for greatly superior Dutch armaments, financial resources, communications 
apparatus, training, and discipline—as well as virtually complete dominance of the 
sea and ait— by a huge, decentralized popular military mobilization. If the core of 
these forces was formed by youthful veterans of military organizations established 
by the Japanese Occupation authorities in 1943-44 (Peta on Java, Madura, and Bali, 
GiyugQn on Sumatra), the bulk consisted of countless spontaneously formed armed 
paramilitary organizations of the most varied political colorations.
By the end of the Revolution a sizeable part of these organizations had been 
absorbed into the Army, which by then numbered well over 350,000. When the 
Dutch departed, the Republic was left with a huge military force that it could not 
afford to maintain on a peacetime basis (thus many of the bitter intramilitary con­
flicts of the 1950s stemmed from efforts made by cabinets and military leaderships 
to reduce the Army to a manageable and affordable size). The manpower surplus 
was above all an officer surplus, and, moreover, one of a specially delicate kind.
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For the revolutionary forces had sprung up virtually overnight, and thus its offi­
cers, NCOs, and rank-and-file were all of the same generation. Sudirman, the 
legendary Commander-in-Chief in the Revolution, assumed this office late in 1945 
at the age of 32. Abdul Haris Nasution became Army Chief of Staff when barely 30 
years old. Accordingly, during the 1950s virtually no officers could be retired on 
grounds of age. It was largely for this reason that an embryo military academy set 
up in the revolutionary capital of Yogyakarta in 1945 was permitted to die in 1949. 
Its very small th ird , and last, class was sent away to study at the Dutch Military 
Academy in Breda. A new military academy was only established (in Magelang) in 
the late 1950s, and it produced its first crop of graduates in 1960. With the excep­
tion of the Breda group, and a quite small number of young men trained at the 
Pusat Pendidikan Perwira Angkatan Darat (P3AD—Army Officer Training Center) 
in Bandung and some rudimentary technical schools (for army engineers, e tc .), 
virtually no new officers were produced during the 1950s. This "vacuum," of 
course, helped to give the veterans of the Revolution a very long lease of power. 
(For example, Suharto was already commander of the Diponegoro Division in Cen­
tral Java at the age of 35, and became head of the Army at 44.) But it also meant 
that when the age-56 retirement rule began to bite, it would do so with a severity 
unimaginable in a professional officer corps with a less unorthodox history. In 
such conventional armies there is typically at any one moment an even upward gra­
dient in the numbers of officers born in successive years; in the Indonesian Army, 
by contrast, the numbers of officers (active,say, in the late 1970s) who were born 
between 1923 and 1927 vastly outnumbered those born between 1928 and 1932. Thus 
the dramatic personnel changes of 1983 must be seen as a sort of after-shock to the 
postrevolutionary collapse of officer-recruitment.*
In the command structure of mid-1983, only one Peta (Generation of ’45) veter­
an remains—the belatedly pensioned Defense Minister, General Poniman. And he re­
mains only because Law 20/1982, separating the functions of Minister of Defense 
and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, explicitly opens the former position 
to officers no longer on active service. Into the vacuum have poured, in a rush, 
graduates of the revolutionary-era Yogyakarta Academy, the Dutch Military Acade­
my at Breda, the P3AD at Bandung, and the revived Military Academy at Magelang. 
For none of these groups has been large enough to fill the place of the Generation 
of '45 on their own.
The Successors
What are the salient characteristics of the "new men"? In what ways are they 
like or unlike their precessors? How far, among themselves, do they form sub­
groups to which real political significance can be attached?
As a group, they are undoubtedly much better schooled, in the conventional 
professional sense, than their forebears. Many received, at a relatively early age, 
considerable training overseas, especially in the US, but also in England, Australia,
* For somewhat different reasons, the Navy and Air Force have been facing analo­
gous problems. During the Revolution, the Republic had no significant air or naval 
arms. During the 1950s their growth was slow and feeble, not least because the 
new state was too poor to afford the colossal expense of importing modern warships 
and airplanes. Only in the 1960s, thanks to substantial aid from the Socialist bloc, 
did they come into their own. Regarded by the Suharto forces as generally pro- 
Sukarno, they were (especially the Air Force) heavily purged in 1965-66. Both 
thus experienced generational bunching like the Army, but their bunchings oc­
curred ten years or so later.
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Pakistan, and elsewhere. Much of this training has been in specialized fields—in­
telligence, logistics, electronics, tank warfare, and so on. A sizeable number of 
them are competent in one, two, or even three Western languages. Almost all have 
spent long periods as trainers, instructors, and teachers in Indonesia's expanding 
military educational system—while waiting for their seniors to age sufficiently to 
give them opportunities to assume responsible command positions and acquire field 
experience.
Such "field experience" as they have had has been significantly different from 
that of most veterans of the Revolution. Where the latter won their spurs in a pop­
ular, semiguerrilla struggle for national independence, some of the former have 
served abroad in international forces stationed in the Congo, the Middle East, and 
Vietnam, and many have participated in a variety of internal counterinsurgency 
campaigns and have fought against the "popular, semiguerrilla struggle for national 
independence" of the East Timorese.
It seems likely that, as a consequence, their loyalties differ significantly from 
those of their seniors. Because the Generation of '45 came to maturity in a decen­
tralized struggle, and typically fought, guerrilla-fashion, on home territory, their 
loyalties were often markedly regional. Hence the strong "vertical" (linking of all 
ranks) attachment that made soldiers proud to be "men of Siliwangi," "men of Dipo- 
negoro," or "men of Brawijaya." The new men, however, more the products of 
classrooms and parade grounds than of rice fields and mountain redoubts, seem to 
have few such regional/divisional ties. They are rather linked "horizontally" to 
class- or school-mates; Breda, P3AD, and AMN now substitute for Siliwangi, Bra­
wijaya, and Diponegoro. And because their numbers are small, and they have lived 
closer together (and more separated from everyone else) than their predecessors, 
they know each other extremely well.
At the same time there are significant differences within the "successors," 
which need to be borne in mind in assessing their future political role. As these 
differences hinge largely on the places and times in which the officers variously 
received their formative education, we can conveniently adopt a fourfold classifica­
tion as follows (see Table B) :
TABLE B
Schools and Classes of Listed Officeholders
Institution Year of Graduation Names
Yogya Academy 1948 Susilo Sudarman
Yogya Academy 1949 Bagus Sumitro; Supardjo (?)
Breda 1955 Harjono Prawirodirdjo; Prajitno (?); 
Rudini; Sudiman Saleh; Soelarso; 
Supardjo (? ); Untung Sridadi
P3AD c. 1952 Murdani; S. Soekoso; Soeweno
Engineers' Academy 1956 Roestandi A. Moestafa
Technical Academy 1959 1 Gde Awet Sara; Try  Soetrisno
AMN, Magelang 1960 Edy Sudradjat; Harsudiyono Hartas;
Ida Bagus Sudjana; Nana Narundana; 
Sembiring Meliala; Simandjuntak; 
Soegiarto; Suripto
AMN, Magelang 1961 Rajagukguk; Soetedjo
AMN, Magelang 1963 Wismoyo Aris Munandar
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a. The Men o f Yogya. The first of our four groups to receive a military edu­
cation, it is also the senior in age (see Table C ). Of the small number of officers 
in this group holding positions in the present listing, the youngest whose age can 
be identified was born in 1929. As of 1983, then, their ages range from 59 to 
about 57, meaning that some have already retired and others will soon be gone. 
During the Revolution their ages would have been 16-19 (in 1995) to 20-23 (in 
1999). Because Yogyakarta was the beleaguered, and eventually occupied,capital 
of the revolutionary Republic, the Academy was forced to recruit largely from 
youths then living on Java, with the natural consequence that the overwhelming 
majority of the cadets were Javanese. For the same reason, their training inevita­
bly had a somewhat ad hoc, rudimentary character. Their experience of the Revo­
lution was rather ambiguous, for though they shared in general terms the atmo­
sphere and vicissitudes of the struggle for national independence, they did so 
mainly in school. Only in the last year of the Revolution, after the Dutch attack of 
December 19, 1998 and the dissolution of the Academy, did they actually participate 
in any fighting. For this reason, more than age (some members of the "Generation 
of '95" were in fact virtual contemporaries), they remained largely in the shadow in 
the 1950s, 1960s, and early 1970s, and only began coming into their own towards 
the end of the last decade. It is thus more than likely that they have no very warm 
feelings towards the Generation of '95, including its most prominent current mem­
ber, President Suharto. And since many were already colonels in 1965-66, when the 
New Order was established, they have no special reason to feel they owe their ca­
reers to him. If  they have any sentimental loyalties, these are more probably at­
tached to their old commandant, retired Lieutenant-General G. P. H. Djatikusumo
TABLE C
Age and Scheduled Retirement Dates for Listed Officeholders
Year of 
Birth
Present
Age
Scheduled
Retirement
Year
Name
1925 58 1981 Yoga Sugama
1926 57 1982 Poniman
1928 55 1989 Romly; Sudiman Saleh; Susilo 
Sudarman
1929 59 1985 Rudini; Supardjo; Soeweno; 
Harjono; Yogie S. Memet
1930 53 1986 Anton Sudjarwo
1931 52 1987 Bambang Triantoro; Kahpi 
Suriadiredja; Sukardi
1932 51 1988 Murdani
1933 50 1989 Roestandi A . Moestafa
1939 99 1990 Suripto
1935 98 1991 Harsudiyono Hartas; Muntaram; 
Try Soetrisno
1936 97 1992 1 Gde Awet Sara; Nana Narundana; 
Soegiarto
1937 96 1993 Soetedjo
1938 95 1999 Rajagukguk
1990 93 1996 Wismoyo Aris Munandar
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(a widely respected figure believed to be quietly critical of many aspects of the 
New Order), than to the President.
b. The Men o f Breda. Originally recruited to form the Yogya Academy's third 
class, these officers are a year or so younger than the Yogya group, and just as 
heavily Javanese in ethnic composition. But if, like the Yogya men, they shared, 
in a general sense, the revolutionary experience, their formative training came in 
the celebrated Military Academy of the ex-colonial master. The education they re­
ceived was a thoroughly modern one, along conventional European lines, with care­
ful specializations in the cavalry (tank), artillery, logistics, finance, and other 
branches. This education, conducted o f course in Dutch, ra the r than in Yogya's 
Indonesian, was intended to produce a first generation of professional officers. As 
it turned out, they were not only the first group of cadets to be trained abroad, 
they were also the last; for while they were in Holland, Dutch-Indonesian relations 
steadily deteriorated, principally over the West Irian issue, and no second group 
was ever sent. This meant that the "Breda men" numbered no more than the 36 
youths who were graduated in 1955. (The graduates of Class I and II of the Yogya 
Academy numbered 196 and 149, respectively.) Their return to Indonesia coincided 
with the onset of the regional crisis and the height of the Darul Islam movement. 
Many of them thus got their first real battle experience in counterinsurgency oper­
ations, and later served with the Caduad,formed in 1961, which, still commanded by 
General Suharto, became Kostrad in 1963. More, then, than their immediate seniors 
were they hitched directly to Suharto's rising star.
c. The Men o f P3AD. The data available on the trainees at this center, located 
in Bandung, are much more fragmentary than those on the Yogya and Breda groups. 
They seem to have been almost exact contemporaries of the Breda group. For ex­
ample, the new Army Chief of Staff, Breda graduate General Rudini, and the new 
Kostrad Commander, P3AD graduate General Soeweno, were both born in 1929. Some 
seem to have been born the previous year. It is known that the new Commander-in- 
Chief of the Armed Forces (Pangab), General Murdani, born in 1932, was among
the youngest. He would have been 13 when the Revolution broke out and just 
turned 17 when it ended. Youths in this age bracket often participated in the 
fighting, either as rank-and-file soldiers or NCOs in the regular Army, or as ac­
tivists in the myriad paramilitary organizations; it is thus likely that many of the 
P3AD men saw a good bit of combat, probably more than did the Yogya and Breda 
cadets. The P3AD was not in fact a "cadet" academy, but a school for further 
training of young men with previous military experience. From the data available 
it appears that the same factors that caused a heavy overrepresentation of Java­
nese (and to a lesser degree Sundanese?) in the Yogya and Breda groups, operated 
for the P3AD. At least one can say that all the P3AD officers on our list are ethnic 
Javanese.
The first group of P3AD graduates (possibly also the last—it is not clear when 
the school was closed or changed its name and purpose) stepped out, as it were, 
onto the streets of Bandung in 1952, just at the time that Col. Alex Kawilarang, 
who commanded the West Java Military Region and the Siliwangi Division from that 
city, was setting up the embryo of what would soon become the famous RPKAD. 
Perhaps naturally, a good number of these P3AD men moved over, then or later, to 
this elite unit, and maintained their identification with it forever after. In 1953, 
Kaliwarang's still "local" commando unit was transferred, along with its first com­
mander, Major Moh. Idjon Djanbi (a tough Eurasian who earlier went by the name of 
Visser), to Army HQ in Jakarta. The transfer was effected by Col. Zulkifli Lubis, 
the legendary Japanese-trained intelligence "whiz," who had become Acting Army 
Chief of Staff in the wake of Col. A. H. Nasution's fall after the so-called "October 
17, 1952 A ffa ir." It was during Lubis' two years (1953-55) in control of the Army
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that the unit expanded and assumed its most celebrated name., and Lubis1 ties with 
it seem to have been strong; for when Lubis, replaced by a reascendant Nasution 
in September 1955, attempted a coup in November of the following year, RPKAD 
units under Major Djaelani played a key role. (The coup plans assigned the RPKAD 
the task of kidnapping Nasution and his closest confidants—a curious foreshadow­
ing of the events of October 1, 1965.) This episode is worth bearing in mind since 
the present Pangab, General Murdani, was then Chief Instructor at the RPKAD 
school at Batujajar (just outside Bandung); the present Kostrad Commander, Gen­
eral Soeweno, was then in the RPKAD's officer corps; and General Sebastian Soe- 
koso, former Commander of Kodam 15, and now Commander-General of the Army's 
Development and Training Command (Kobanglit AD), is known to have been briefly 
arrested for his participation in the failed RPKAD coup. All three had been class­
mates earlier on at the P3AD.
What is striking about the subsequent careers of the P3AD group (which we 
might rename the P3AD-RPKAD) is that their associations with "intelligence" and 
political activism have remained very strong—far stronger than has been the case 
for any of our other three subgroups. The group's "star," Murdani, led RPKAD 
commando units against the rebel Permesta capital of Menado in 1958, and achieved 
national fame, alongside the less fortunate (late) Lieutenant-Colonel Untung, by 
leading parachute drops into West Irian during the Irian campaign of 1961-62.
Along with fellow P3AD-RPKAD leaders C. I. Santoso and Soeweno, he played a 
key role in the massacres of PKI supporters in 1965-66. The same group had much 
to do with the military suppression of the Free Papua Movement after Santoso be­
came Territorial Commander there in 1978. As for the invasion and occupation of 
East Timor, Murdani masterminded it from Jakarta, while his P3AD-RPKAD asso­
ciates Dading Kalbuadi and Soeweno executed his policies on the spot from 1975 to 
1983.* No less significant are the group's close personal ties to President Suharto, 
which date back to his days as commander of Caduad (1961-63). From Caduad's in­
ception, the RPKAD formed its elite core, and it retained this role after Caduad 
was transformed into Kostrad in 1963. It fought directly under Suharto when as 
Mandala Commander he led the campaign against the Dutch in West Irian, and like­
wise when as Kostrad Commander he crushed the PKI in 1965. And since 1974, 
Murdani has essentially dominated the political intelligence bureaucracies of Indo­
nesia for his long-time chief.
d. The Men o f Magelang. All but one of the Magelang men on our list were 
graduated from the AMN (National Military Academy)'s first two classes (1960 and 
1961). Born between 1934 and 1938, the oldest of these men was 15, the youngest 
11 when the Revolution ended. When the New Order was set up early in 1966, they 
were relatively recent Academy graduates and most were about 30 years old. In 
terms of training, their experience was probably closest to that of the Yogya group, 
in that they got a reasonably conventional, apolitical, and domestic schooling. The 
planner of the Academy was Djatikusumo, former head of the Yogya Academy; and 
its first commandant was Surjosularso, a Solonese aristocrat like Djatikusumo, who 
had been trained at Breda in the late 1930s. During the 1970s and early 1980s the 
AMN graduates have participated in various counterinsurgency campaigns. A few 
played roles in East Timor between 1975 and 1979, but it appears that these were 
subordinate, and there is no indication that members of the group had much hand 
in policy making. Many have been connected with Kostrad, but well after Suharto
* In addition to Murdani, Kalbuadi, and Soeweno, at least the following current 
officeholders have been involved in the military operations in East Timor: Rajaguk- 
guk; Sembiring Meliala; Edy Sudrajat; Sutarto; Try Soetrisno; and probably Bagus 
Sumitro.
106
relinquished direct command over it. Thus in terms of ties to the President they 
lie, along with the Breda group, in the middle of the spectrum that runs from the 
Yogya men to the P3AD-RPKAD men. The feature that marks this group most deci­
sively off from all the others is its multi-ethnicity.* It is striking, for example, 
that only h a lf of the Magelang men on our list are Javanese, the rest being various­
ly Sundanese, Batak, and—mirabile dictu—Balinese, t
In our listing at least twelve of the sixteen territorial commands are held by 
AMN graduates, and their distribution tells us something both about the Magelang- 
ers and the nature of the military control system under the late New Order. Batak 
generals now run Irian Jaya (West Irian ), Protestant North Sulawesi, and Protes­
tant and Muslim Maluku—but not Protestant Batak North Sumatra. Balinese gen­
erals run West and East Kalimantan, but not the West Nusatenggara in which their 
home is located.$ The commander in Sundanese West Java is a Javanese, but not, 
as so often before, a Javanese with long previous service in the area with its Sili- 
wangi Division. This pattern highlights both the solidity of the center's control 
and its ability to ignore "localist" ethnic sentiment, as well as the Magelangers* ab­
sence of significant "Divisional" ties.
There are three officers on our list who do not precisely fit into the four groups 
described above. All are late 1950s graduates of small technical military academies. 
Far and away the most important of them is Try Soetrisno, presently commander of 
the politically sensitive Metropolitan Territorial Command in Jakarta. Born in 1935, 
he is the same age as many of the Magelangers, though a 1959 graduate of the Army 
Engineers' Academy. His mildly "outsider" status among the younger men is, how­
ever, more than compensated for by his very close ties with President Suharto, 
whom he served as personal adjutant for almost five years (1974-78).
The Politics o f Generational S h ift
What the government calls "successed" elections, largely rubber-stamp "par­
ticipatory" state organs, and a civilian technocracy aside, the Suharto regime has 
from its onset been a military regime, and Suharto's personal ascendancy has
* As we have seen, most of the officers of the Generation of '45 came from Java and 
Sumatra, where the Japanese established sizeable military units in 1943-45, and 
where, in 1945-49, the Dutch were least successful in their pacification campaigns. 
During the early 1950s, when regional dissidence was severe and Jakarta's control 
weak, the Army high command devoted its training efforts to young men who were 
either native inhabitants of Java or had been brought up there. But by the time 
the AMN was established General Nasution and his confidants were determined to 
"renationalize" the younger officer corps and made explicit efforts to recruit cadets 
on a regionally proportional basis. These efforts were, in addition, very much in 
line with the strongly nationalist atmosphere of "the transition to Guided Democ­
racy ."
f  This represents the first time that Balinese—once celebrated as warriors all over 
the western half of the archipelago—have entered the top military elite. Their ab­
sence hitherto can be explained in part by a ruthlessly successful Dutch pacifica­
tion effort in 1946-49, the notorious reluctance—till recently—of Balinese to leave 
their island, and the relative backwardness of educational institutions in Bali in the 
1950s.
J One of these Balinese, I Gde Awet Sara, is not actually a Magelanger. He was 
graduated in 1959 from the Army's Technical Academy in Bandung. But he is of 
the same generation as the AMN cadets on our list.
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depended on maintaining control over the Armed Forces. This control has been 
achieved by four basic means, three of which are well known and widely commented 
on, while the fourth merits special attention in connection with our generational 
shift.
First and foremost has been Suharto's "historic" role in the destruction in 
1965-66 of the Indonesian Communist Party and its left-wing nationalist allies, and 
the subsequent overthrow of President Sukarno (de facto by the coup of March 11, 
1966, de jure in 1968). These events assured the Army its institutional integrity 
and unchallenged dominance of Indonesian life, and earned Suharto an enormous 
fund of intramilitary legitimacy.
Second has been the vast patronage available to him in the form of jobs and 
money. On the one hand, the massive purge of the Communist and nationalist left 
from state organs of all kinds, and at every level, down even to the village, left 
thousands of positions open for filling with grateful followers and potential oppo­
nents within the Army. And insofar as the events of 1965-66 permitted an exten­
sive, if largely unpublicized, purge within the Army itself—as well as the virtual 
gutting of the Air Force and the Navy (especially its elite Marine Corps), the num­
bers of "job seekers" in the military were far less than those confronting any pre­
vious top Indonesian military leader. On the other hand, the massive foreign aid 
provided the anti-Communist, pro-American New Order regime, and, after 1973, 
the colossal rise in world oil prices, gave Suharto financial resources for buttress­
ing his position beyond the dreams of any predecessor. There cannot be many 
senior and middle-ranking Army officers (at least those who have not served time 
in prison) who have not benefitted substantially from the flow of largesse, even if 
its distribution has been far from even-handed. It was largely this patronage re­
source base that permitted Suharto to "solve" the problem of the "excess officer 
manpower" of the Generation of '45. (Thousands of these officers found comfort­
able berths in state corporations, erstwhile civilian ministries, local governments, 
and representative bodies.) It also permitted a reduction in the overall size of the 
Armed Forces to a level well below that of 1950 (even though Indonesia's population 
has almost doubled since that ye ar).
Third has been an astute manipulation of military factions and watchful distri­
bution of key military functions. Dangerously "militant" allies of the early New 
Order period, such as the commanders of the strategic Java territorial commands— 
Generals Dharsono, Surono, and Jasin—were deftly maneuvered out of power and 
kicked upstairs. General A. H. Nasution, in many ways the father of the Indone­
sian Army, was assigned the prestigious but powerless position of Chairman of the 
MPRS, and not long afterwards sent into retirement and obscurity. Even those 
senior officers identified as long-time aides and personal confidants of Suharto 
have had their ups and downs—Alamsyah, Yoga Sugama, even Ali Murtopo are 
cases in point. Key henchmen like Generals Suryo, Sudjono Humardhani, Pangga- 
bean, Amir Machmud, and Yusuf have in turn been edged into the background.
The position of Kostrad Commander, from which Suharto seized the presidency, has 
been rotated more rapidly than any other position in the top echelons of the mili­
tary hierarchy (see Table D ). Nor has Suharto forgotten to fill many key posts 
with what one might call "military cripples"—in other words, men whose religion, 
ethnic background, or historic experience in an Army dominated by abangan-Muslim 
Javanese effectively precludes them from serious ambitions for the presidency: ob­
vious examples are two recent Ministers of Defense, the Protestant Toba Batak 
Panggabean, and the Muslim Buginese Andi Mohammad Yusuf; and the long-term
TABLE D
Kostrad Commanders
Name MilitaryBackground
Ethnic
Background
Religious
Affiliation Length of Term
Months 
in Office
1. Suharto D J abangan 1. I I 1.61-1 .V . 63 (Commander of Caduad) 
I . V . 63-7.X I I . 65 (Commander of Kostrad)
57
2. Umar Wira-
hadikusumah
SI S 7 7.XII .65-27.V .67 19*
3. Kemal Idris SI Minang 7 27.V .67-11.I I I . 69 21*
4. Wahono B J abangan 11.I I I . 69-20.I I . 70 11
5. Makmun Murod SI Lampunger? ? 20.I I . 70-28.X I I . 71 22
6. Wahono B J abangan 28.X I I . 71-18.IV .73 16
7. Poniman SI J abangan 18. IV. 73-4. V. 74 12*
8. Himawan SI
(Yogya 1)
J abangan 4 .V .74-4.1.75 8
9. Lopulisa SI Ambonese Christian 4.1.75-19.1.78 36*
10. Wiyogo SI
(Yogya 1)
J abangan 19.1.78-20.111.80 26
11. Ismail D J abangan 20.111.80-24.1.81 10
12. Rudini D?
Breda
J abangan 24.1.81-24.V .83 28
13. Soeweno RPKAD
P3AD
J abangan 24.V.83-
Average tenure (excluding Suharto) = c. 19 months
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intelligence "czar" and current Commander-in-Chief, Catholic Eurasian Benny Mur- 
dani.*
The fourth and most pertinent factor in the present discussion is Suharto's 
role as the "founding father" of Caduad-Kostrad between 1961 and 1965. The first 
to hold command of this force, he also held it longer than anyone else. As we noted 
earlier, he thereby forged personal ties of some importance with the younger gen­
eration, above all the P3AD-RPKAD group, but also, if to a lesser extent, with the 
Breda and Magelang men. What perhaps should be emphasized here is that he was 
almost unique among the Generation of '45 in having such extensive cross-genera­
tional relationships, which have lasted well after he relinquished direct command of 
Kostrad, of the Army, and of the Ministry of Defense.
How does this complex of factors help to explain Suharo's intramilitary maneu­
vers in recent years? One must begin with the startling contrast between what one 
might term the "Jakarta Spring" of 1983 and the Suharto policy of the 1970s and 
early 1980s, which, as we emphasized in earlier listings, placed enormous emphasis 
on continuity, in other words, keeping trusted subordinates in key positions for 
many years beyond the normal tour of duty. As of early July 1983 only one such 
figure remained in place, 59-year-old retired General Yoga Sugama, who has held 
the essentially nonmilitary post of Bakin chief for an astonishing nine and a half 
years (113 months).
There is no doubt that the central reason for the change in policy has been the 
retirement-age norm, which inexorably drove old trusted subordinates out of active 
service, even though they would be retained as long as possible. This norm is so 
fundamental to the professional standards, so crucial to the morale of junior and 
middle officers in all modern armies that political leaders tamper with it at their 
peril. It is safe to say that nothing would have more dangerously solidified military 
opinion against Suharto than any significant attempt to break the rule, or arbitrar­
ily, and for obvious political reasons, to change the traditional retirement age. The 
problem facing the palace was thus how to handle the inevitable generational change 
with maximal advantage. This objective accounts more than anything else for the 
series of strange episodes, beginning in the summer of 1980, which preceded the 
"Jakarta Spring," and for the "Spring" itself.
The series began when the retirement rule was allowed to force Army Chief of 
Staff General Widodo out of office. As of early 1980 Widodo was perhaps the one 
remaining Generation of '45 officer still on active service with Suharto-ish creden­
tials for the presidency. He was an abangan Javanese from Central Java, and a 
veteran of Peta and the Revolution. A Diponegoro Division stalwart, he had held 
a succession of key command posts, and played an important role in the cataclysm 
of 1965-66. During his tenure as Army Chief of Staff he had been able to fill most 
of the immediate positions under his control with his personal choices and appeared 
to be popular inside the Army. But if he were to act, he would have to act before 
April 1980,when he was due to retire. In the event,he did nothing, perhaps be­
cause he was lured with empty promises of being made either Minister of Defense or 
Kopkamtib Commander. In accordance with Army tradition, he was succeeded by 
his Deputy, S. Poniman, a Solonese who had spent most of his career with the Sili- 
wangi Division. Widely regarded as a competent, but colorless and unambitious, 
officer, and with only two years to go before retirement, Poniman seemed an ideal 
choice from the palace's point of view. The problem then arose of who should be­
come his deputy. Traditionally, the post went to the commander of the most impor­
* It is a mild curiosity of Indonesia's military history that the founder of the RPKAD 
and its best-known son should both be Eurasians.
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tant Regional Command, Kowilhan II ,  which covers Java, Madura, and Bali. The 
officer holding this position in the summer of 1980 was General Wijoyo Suyono, a 
Peta veteran and Brawijaya Division man with a strong personality and a reputation 
for ambition. (The palace may also have worried about his ties to General Sumitro, 
the powerful Brawijaya general who ran Kopkamtib till his fall from power after the 
"Malari" riots in January 1974.) Accordingly, Wijoyo Suyono was not given the 
Deputy-ship (and thus the likelihood of the Chief of Staff-ship) but instead was 
made Deputy Commander of Kopkamtib under Admiral Sudomo, two years his senior. 
There he remained until December 1982, when he was abruptly and prematurely 
sent into retirement. The really curious thing, however, is not Wijoyo Suyono's 
being passed over for the post of Deputy Chief of Staff, but that the position was 
left empty for the almost three years that Poniman served as Army Chief of Staff 
(1980-83). The "Yogya men" had three obvious candidates for the position—Susilo 
Sudarman, Commander of Kowilhan I; Wiyogo Atmodarminto, Wijoyo Suyono's suc­
cessor as commander of Kowilhan I I ; and Himawan Sutanto, commander of the Na­
tional Strategic Command (Kostranas)—but none was given the job.
The next "oddities" occurred in 1982, the last full year of Suharto's third 
presidential term, and their timing probably has to be understood in this context. 
The final months of his second term (December 1977-February 1978) had been 
marked by clear signs of disagreement within the top military elite and by massive 
student protests. Repression and patronage had been successfully employed to 
silence this opposition, but Suharto was plainly anxious to avoid their recrudes­
cence on the eve of his fourth term.
First of ail, when Poniman's turn for retirement came, in July 1982, the rules 
were quietly bent in his favor, in contrast to what had happened to Widodo. He 
was permitted to remain at his post and on active duty for a further nine months— 
till Suharto's reelection for a fourth term had been "successed." That the palace 
felt some awkwardness about this maneuver is suggested by the fact that when, in 
December 1982,the other three service chiefs were simultaneously replaced (and 
Wijoyo Suyono pushed into early retirement), very little publicity was given to 
what normally would have been a major public occasion. Clearly, a bigger "splash" 
would have underlined the "absence of change" in the Army, and Poniman's contin­
uing in office when his exact contemporary, Walujo Sugito, was retired as Navy 
Chief of Staff, and Ashadi Tjahjadi, two years his junior, as Air Force Chief of 
Staff.
Second was the timing of the passage of Law 20, to which we have earlier 
alluded. Nothing suggests that this timing was prompted by administrative need, 
demands for efficiency, or external crisis. The New Order military had got along 
perfectly well without it for sixteen years. Moreover, the vagueness of the law, 
and the fact, referred to earlier, that its practical effects have still not been 
worked out a whole year later, strongly suggest that its passage was determined 
by political considerations.
Some of these considerations can be deduced from a look at the military losers 
and winners in the "Jakarta Spring." The most obvious loser was General Yusuf, 
till March 1983 Minister of Defense and Armed Forces' Commander-in-Chief, and 
thereafter head of the Financial Audits Agency—a civilian post of which the only 
significance is that its insignificance made it a suitable place to find figurehead 
Vice-Presidents (Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX in 1968; General Umar Wirahadikusu- 
mah in 1983). Yusuf was not due to retire till 1984, and he was replaced as De­
fense Minister by a man two years his senior. Yet it is unlikely that Yusuf was the 
main target of the maneuvers we have been describing, since he had never succeed­
ed during his five years in office (1978-83) in gaining effective control of his
i n
ministry, and his early popularity with the civilian world had apparently faded 
away. Less obvious, but more important, losers were the "men of Yogya," who, 
we noted above, are the least tied /committed to Suharto of all the post-Generation 
of '45 leadership subgroups. None was named Minister of Defense, none Pangab, 
and none Army Chief of Staff. Given the expected pattern of retirements it looks 
as if they will never hold either of the latter positions. Indeed it seems fairly clear 
that Poniman's failure to appoint a deputy, and the very unusual prolongation of 
his term in office as Army Chief of Staff were designed to prevent a Yogya man 
from assuming control of the Army.
And the winners? A fair assessment must await the full implementation of Law 
20, and we expect to return to this question in the next issue of Indonesia. On a 
preliminary basis, one can suggest the following:
i. The Generation of '45. General Poniman's appointment as Minister of De­
fense in effect opens this major ministerial post to re tire d  officers, and most retired 
officers are members of that generation. Poniman can stay on indefinitely at Suhar­
to's pleasure, and the President faces no institutional restraints in replacing him 
with another favored member of his own generation at some future date. From the 
palace's point of view this means a semipermanent division of power between the
old and new military guards, which will surely help to ensure its own supremacy.
ii. The P3AD group, above all its leader General Murdani. We will defer a full 
discussion of Murdani till our next issue. Suffice it to say that the appointment as 
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of an intelligence specialist who has never 
personally commanded any unit larger than a battalion is extraordinary and defies 
all the norms of professional modern militaries. It does, however, represent an 
acknowledgment of the dominance of "intelligence" in New Order political arrange­
ments, and Murdani's unofficial status as Suharto's closest aide and the second 
most powerful man in Indonesia for the past seven to eight years. Murdani's old 
comrade from P3AD days. General Soeweno, is now Kostrad Commander; and two 
other important members of the group, Dading Kalbuadi and C. I. Santoso, have 
already been announced as Assistants for Logistics and Functional Group Affairs.
If the implementation of Law 20 eventually assigns these positions to Murdani's 
sphere, they will reinforce his power directly; if they are assigned to the Defense 
Ministry, Murdani will have "his" men working directly under the Minister.
iii. The Breda group. General Rudini's appointment as Army Chief of Staff is 
clearly a triumph of sorts for this group. And Rudini has lost no time in appointing 
former classmates to his immediate staff. His personal ascendancy within the group 
may be underscored by the fact that when he eventually appointed a deputy, he 
did so only a fte r  all other key Army appointments had been made, and that his 
nominee, Lieut.-General Bambang Triantoro, is a colorless ordnance officer who 
has never held a command position of any kind ( i .e . ,  would be unacceptable as 
Army Chief of S ta ff). But looked at from another angle, Rudini's position is rather 
equivocal. As we noted earlier, the Breda group is extremely small and in itself 
cannot really form a solid power base. Breda men control only one territorial com­
mand (E. Java), and one regional command (Kowilhan I I I— if General Supardjo is 
really a Breda man). Rudini himself must retire in 1985, and meantime he is posi­
tioned over still-active Yogya men, like Susilo Sudarman, and under a P3AD man. 
General Murdani, who is three years his junior. In a culture which stresses the 
importance of age, and a profession which is deeply attached to seniority, Rudini's 
position thus has its delicate aspects.
iv. The men of Magelang. In sheer quantitative terms, this group has been 
the major beneficiary of the "Jakarta Spring." But again, the details suggest a 
more complex picture. The "golden boy" of Class I, General Soegiarto, who was
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the first of his group to become a Pangdam (Kodam X IV , in May 1979), now heads 
Kodam V II (C . Java) and the Diponegoro Division, a position once held by Suharto 
himself and former Army Chief of Staff Widodo. But he is, as it were, "balanced" 
by General Try Soetrisno, one year his senior, in the politically pivotal Kodam V 
(Metropolitan Jakarta). As noted earlier. Try Soetrisno is not a Magelanger, and 
thus a bit of an outsider, but he is exceptionally close to the President. The odds 
are excellent that he, not Soegiarto, will succeed Rudini as Army Chief of Staff in 
1985.
We may conclude by observing that the President appears to have succeeded in 
achieving what was postulated as his main objective: handling the generational shift 
in such a way as to maximize his own power. With the exception of the "men of 
Yogya" all the subgroups in the post-Generation of '45 military elite have benefitted 
from the "Jakarta Spring," but these benefits have been distributed intelligently in 
the spirit of divide et impera.
k k k
As an experiment we have decided to append to the present listing as much rel­
evant biographical data on each new appointee as are presently available to us 
(arranged alphabetically at the end of the lis ts ). The numbers after the appoint- 
tees1 names refer to these biographies. Inevitably, the completeness of such data 
varies greatly from individual to individual. We should add that "blanks" in an 
officer's career record very often reflect intelligence assignments. As these biog­
raphies include many military abbreviations in addition to those we usually use, we 
are including a separate glossary, which should make them easier to follow.
Postscript:
On August 16, 1983, Suharto issued Presidential Decision No. 46/1983, describ­
ing the new organizational structure of the Defense Department, but not that of the 
Pangab's staff. In our next issue we hope to outline these structures and list the 
officers occupying the most important of the positions.
113
Glossary o f Abbreviations
Akabri Akademi Angkatan Bersenjata 
Republik Indonesia
Indonesian Armed Forces' 
Academy
Akad Teknik Akademi Teknik Technical Academy
Akad Zeni Akademi Zeni Engineers' Academy
AMN* Akademi Militer Nasional National Military Academy
B Brawijaya
Bakin Badan Koordinasi Intelijen 
Negara
State Intelligence Coordi­
nating Agency
BB Bukit Barisan
Brimob Brigade Mobil Mobile Brigade
Caduad Cadangan Umum Angkatan Darat Army General Reserve
D Diponegoro
J Javanese
KKO Korps Komando (Marinir) Marines
Kobangdiklat Komando Pengembangan 
Pendidikan dan Latihan
Training and Education 
Development Command
Kobanglit AD Komando Pengembangan dan 
Penelitian Angkatan Darat
Army Research and Develop­
ment Command
Kodak Komando Daerah Kepolisian Police Area Command
Kodam Komando Daerah Militer Military Area Command
Kodau Komando Daerah Angkatan 
Udara
Air Force Area Command
Kodim Komando Distrik Militer Military District Command
Komapta Komando Samapta Readiness Command (Police)
Kopassandha Komando Pasukan Sandi Yudha Army Paracommando Command 
(Special Forces)
Kopkamtib Komando Pemulihan Keamanan 
dan Ketertiban
Command for the Restoration 
of Security and Public Ordei
Kopur Komando Tempur Combat Command
Kopur Linud Komando Tempur Lintas Udara Airborne Combat Command
Korem Komando Resort Militer Military Subarea Command
Kores Komando Resort Subarea Command (Police)
Kostrad Komando Strategi Angkatan 
Darat
Army Strategic Command
Kostranas Komando Strategi Nasional National Strategic Command
* This was incorporated as the General and Army subdivision of the new Armed 
Forces' Academy (Akabri) as of October 5, 1966.
mKowilhan Komando Wilayah Pertahanan Defense Region Command
KSAD (Kasad) Kepala Staf Angkatan Darat Army Chief of Staff
Kupaltu Kursus Perwira Lanjutan Satu Advanced Officers' Training 
Course 1
Lemhannas Lembaga Pertahanan Nasional National Defense Institute
Pangab Panglima Angkatan Bersenjata Armed Forces Commander
Pangdam Panglima Daerah Militer Military Area Commander
P3AD Pusat Pendidikan Perwira 
Angkatan Darat
Army Officer Training Center
Pangkowilhan Panglima Komando Wilayah 
Pertahanan
Commander of Defense Region 
Command
Pomad Polisi Militer Angkatan Darat Army Military Police
RPKAD
(Kopassandha)
Resimen Para Komando 
Angkatan Darat
Army Para Commando 
Regiment
S Sundanese
Satgas Satuan Tugas Task Unit
Sekumad Sekretariat Umum Angkatan 
Darat
Army General Secretariat
Seskau Sekolah Staf dan Komando 
Angkatan Udara
Air Force Staff and Command 
School
Sesko Sekolah Staf dan Komando Staff and Command School
Seskoad (pre­
viously SSKAD)
Sekolah Staf dan Komando 
Angkatan Darat
Army Staff and Command 
School
Seskoal Sekolah Staf dan Komando 
Angkatan Laut
Navy Staff and Command 
School
Seskogab Sekolah Staf dan Komando 
Cabungan
Joint Services' Staff and 
Command School
SI Siliwangi
SUAD Staf Umum Angkatan Darat Army General Staff
Suslapa Kursus Lanjutan Perwira Officers' Advanced Course
Yon Zipur Batalyon Zeni Tempur Combat Engineers Battalion
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SERVICE HEADS AND ARMY HIERARCHY
Minister of Defense and Security
1. Gen. Andi Mohammad Yusuf
(b. June 23, 1928, S. Sulawesi)
2. Gen. S. Poniman12
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces 
1. Gen. Andi Mohammad Yusuf
2. Gen. Leonardus Benjamin 
("Benny") Murdani10 
(P3AD)
Commander of Kopkamtib
1. Admiral R. Sudomo 
(b . 1926, E. Java)
2. Gen. Leonardus Benjamin 
Murdani10
Deputy Commander of Kopkamtib*
Gen. Wijoyo Suyono
(b. May 1, 1928, Tulung Agung)
Army Chief of Staff
1. Gen. S. Poniman
(b. July 18, 1926, Solo)
2. Lt. Gen. Rudinii6 
(Breda)
17.IV .78 -  28.111.83 (59 months)
Gen. Maradean Panggabean
Minister of Industry
Hasanuddin Buginese
28.111.83 (3 months)
Army Chief of Staff 
SI J
17.IV .78 -  28.111.83 (59 months)
Gen. Maradean Panggabean
Minister of Industry
Hasanuddin Buginese
28.111.83 (3 months)
Assistant for Security, Dept, of Defense 
and Security/
Head, Strategic Intelligence Center/
Deputy Head, Bakin
RPKAD J
17.IV .78 -  29.111.83 (59 months) 
Gen. (and President) Suharto 
Chief of Staff, Kopkamtib 
Navy J
29. Ill .83 (3 months)
As above
RPKAD J
27.X I I . 80 -  4 .X I I . 82 (23 months) 
Gen. Yoga Sugama 
Commander, Kowilhan II 
B/RPKAD J
15.IV .80 -  7 .I I I . 83 (35 months) 
Gen. Widodo
Deputy Army Chief of Staff 
SI J
7. II1 .83 (4 months)
Commander, Kostrad 
D J
* After General Wijoyo Suyono's abrupt retirement, no successor was appointed. 
It is generally believed that General Murdani opposes the appointment of a new 
deputy.
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Navy Chief of Staff
1. Admiral Walujo Sugito
(b. July 9, 1926, Yogya)
2. Vice-Admiral Mohammad Romly15
Air Force Chief of Staff
1. A ir Marshal Ashadi Tjahjadi 
(b . May 5, 1928, Gombong)
2. Air Vice-Marshal Sukardi25
Chief of the National Police
1. Police Lt. Gen. Dr. Awaloeddin 
Djamin
2. Police Lt. Gen. Anton Sudjarwo22
Commander of the Marine Corps
1. Lt. Gen. (M ar.) Kahpi
Suriadiredja
(b. June 14, 1931, Bandung) 2
2. Brig. Gen. (M ar.) Muntaram9
18.V I . 77 -  4 .X I I . 82 (65* months) 
Admiral R. Subijakto 
Deputy Navy Chief of Staff 
Navy J
4 .X II .82 (7 months)
Chief of Operations Staff, Dept, of 
Defense and Security 
Navy J
18.V I .77 - 4 .X I I . 82 (65* months) 
Air Marshal Saleh Basarah 
Deputy Air Force Chief of Staff 
Air Force J
4 .X I I . 82 (7 months)
Commander, Kostranas
Air Force J
26.IX .78 -  4 .X I I . 82 (50 months)
Police Gen. Drs. Widodo Budidarmo 
Ambassador to Bonn
Police Minangkabau
4.XI 1.82 (7 months)
Chief of Police, Jakarta 
Police (Brimob) J
28.V I I . 77 -  7.V .83 (69 months)
Lt. Gen. (M ar.) H. Mohammed Anwar 
Chief of Staff, Marine Corps 
Marines S
7.V.83 (2 months)
Chief of Staff, Marine Corps 
Marines S?
Commander, First Regional Defense Command 
(Kowilhan I—Sumatra and W. Kalimantan)
Lt. Gen. Susilo Sudarman31 31.X I I . 80 (30 months)
(Yogya I) Maj. Gen. Wiyogo Atmodarminto
Commander-General, Armed Forces 
Academy
SI/Cavalry J
Commander, Second Regional Defense Command 
(Kowilhan I I—Java, Madura, Nusatenggara)
1. Lt. Gen. Wiyogo Atmodarminto 2.1.81 - 12.11.83 (25 months)
(Yogya I) Lt. Gen. Wijoyo Suyono
Commander, Kowilhan I 
SI J
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2. Lt. Gen. R. Yogie Suwardi 12.11.83 (4£ months)
Memet1*0 Commander, Kodam VI
SI/RPKAD Cirebonese
Commander, Third Regional Defense Command
(Kowilhan I I I—Sulawesi, S ., C ., and E. Kalimantan)
1. Lt. Gen. R. Himawan Sutanto 
(b . September 14, 1929, 
Magetan) (Yogya I)
29.1.81 - 7 . I I I . 83 (25 months) 
Lt. Gen. Leo Lopulisa 
Commander, Kostranas 
SI J
2. Lt. Gen. Supardjo29 
(Yogya II)
7 .111.83 (4 months)
Assistant for Politics, Strategy, and 
General Planning/Assistant for Logis­
tics, Dept, of Defense and Security
SI J
Commander, Fourth Regional Defense Command 
(Kowilhan IV—Maluku and Irian Jaya)
1. Lt. Gen. R. Seno Hartono 28.IV .81 -  8 . I I I . 83 (22? months)
(b . 1927, Madiun) (Yogya 1) Vice-Admiral Drs. R. M. Soebroto Joedono 
Assistant for Operations, Dept, of Defense 
and Security
SI/RPKAD J
2. Lt. Gen. (M ar.) Kahpi 
Suriadiredja8
8. Ill .83 (4 months)
Commander, Marine Corps 
Marines S
Deputy Army Chief of Staff 
Lt. Gen. Bambang Triantoro3 28.V .83 (1 month)
Commander-General, Army Research, 
Development and Training Command 
Ordnance J
First Assistant (Security)
1. Maj. Gen. Soelarso 
(Breda)
2.11.81 -  23.V .83 (28 months) 
Maj. Gen. Abdurrachman Suhodo 
Commander, Kodam III 
D J
2. Brig. Gen. Ari Bandiyoko1 23.V .83 (1 month)
Commander, Kodam IV 
Engineers/B J
Second Assistant (Operations)
1. Maj. Gen. Soeweno
(b. 1929, Madiun) (P3AD)
3 0 .X .78 -  23.V.83 (55 months) 
Maj. Gen. H. Endang Sukma 
Commander, Kodam XVI 
RPKAD J
2. Brig. Gen. Prajitno13 
(Breda?)
23. V. 83 (1 month)
7
Artillery ?/SI J
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Third Assistant (Personnel) 
1. Maj. Gen. Soeharto
2. Maj. Gen. Sudiman Saleh20 
(Breda)
Fourth Assistant (Logistics)
1. Lt. Gen. Haroen Soewardi
2. Brig. Gen. Ishak Odang7
28.V I I I . 78 -  23.V.83 (57 months)
Maj. Gen. Abdullah Sadjad 
Deputy Assistant for Security, Dept, of 
Defense and Security 
D? J
23.V .83 (1 month)
Governor, General and Army Division, 
Armed Forces' Academy 
B J
?.X11.77 -  23.V .83 (65 months)
Maj. Gen. Iksan Soegiarto 
Commander, Kodam IV 
B J
23.V .83 (1 month)
Head, Army General Supply Service 
?
? S?
Fifth Assistant (Research and Development)
1. Lt. Gen. Supardjo
(b. August 21, 1929, Nganjuk) 
(Yogya II)
2. Brig. Gen. Darsoyo1*
( B reda)
Assistant for Terrritorial Affairs 
1. Lt. Gen. Abdul Rivai Harahap
2. Brig. Gen. Harjono
Prawirodirdjo5 (Breda)
c. 25 .1.76 -  23.V .83 (88 months)
Brig. Gen. Suprapto 
Commander, Kodam X 
D J
23.V .83 (1 month)
Deputy Assistant for Territorial Affairs, 
Dept, of Defense and Security 
? J
7 .1.78 -  23.V.83 (88£ months)
Maj. Gen. Andi Azis Bustam 
Commander, Kodam I
BB Mandailing Batak
23.V.83 (1 month)
Deputy Governor, General Army Division, 
Armed Forces' Academy 
B/Cavalry J
Commander, Army Strategic Reserve
1. Lt. Gen. Rudini
(b . December 15, 1929, Malang) 
(Breda)
2. Maj. Gen. Soeweno31*
(P3AD)
(Kostrad)
24.1.81 - 24.V .83 (27 months)
Maj. Gen. Ismail 
Commander, Kodam X III 
D J
24.V.83 (1 month)
Second Assistant (Operations), Army 
Chief of Staff
RPKAD J
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Governor, General and Army Division, 
Armed Forces' Academy
1. Maj. Gen. Sudiman Saleh
(b. June 5, 1928, Yogya) 
(Breda)
2. Maj. Gen. Untung Sridadi 
Tjokrowidjojo37 (Breda)
Commander, Army Staff and Command
Maj. Gen. Bagus Sumitro28 
(Yogya II)
8.V.81 -  c. 6 .V I .83 (25 months) 
Maj. Gen. Gunawan Wibisono 
Commander, Kodam X 
B J
c. 6 .V I .83 (1 month)
Army Inspector-General 
D J
School
27.IV .81 (26 months)
Maj. Gen. Bambang Triantoro 
Commander, Kodam XV 
B J
Commander-General, Army Logistics Command
Brig. Gen. Yoes Adipoernomo* 
(Yogya I)
Commander-General, Army Research, 
Development and Training Command
1. Lt. Gen. Bambang Triantoro
(b. January 7, 1931, Surabaya)
2. Brig. Gen. Sebastian Soekoso26 
(P3AD)
Commander, Kopassandha
1. Lt. Gen. R. Yogie Suwardi Memet 
(b . 1929, Cirebon)
2. Brig. Gen. Wismoyo Aris 
Munandar38 
(AMN 1963)
26 .IX .77 -  7.11.83 (64 months)
Maj. Gen. Amir Judowinarno 
Deputy Commander-General, Army Logis­
tics Command
Quartermaster Corps J
8. IV .81 -  25.V.83 (25* months)
Maj. Gen. Alex Prawiraatmadja 
Commander, Army Staff and Command 
School
Quartermaster Corps J
25.V .83 (1 month)
Commander, Kodam XV 
RPKAD J
31 .V . 75 - 6. IV .83 (94 months)
Brig. Gen. Witarmin
Commander, Airborne Combat Command, 
Kostrad
SI/RPKAD Cirebonese
6. IV .83 (3 months)
Commander, Group I Kopassandha 
(Serang)
RPKAD J
* Yoes Adipoernomo retired in February 1983, and there is no information yet on 
his successor.
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T e rrito ria l Commands (Kodam)
I. Iskandarmuda (Aceh)
1. Maj. Gen. Djoni Abdurachman
2. Brig. Gen. (Cavalry) Nana 
Narundana11 
(AMN 1960)
I I .  Bukit Barisan (N . Sumatra)
1. Maj. Gen. Edy Sudradjat 
(AMN 1960)
2. Brig. Gen. Harsudiyono Hartas6 
(AMN 1960)
I I I .  17 Agustus (W. Sumatra)
1. Maj. Gen. Sarwono 
(Breda)
2. Brig. Gen. Suripto30 
(AMN 1960)
IV. Sriwijaya (S. Sumatra)
1. Brig. Gen. Try Soetrisno
(b. November 15, 1935, Sura­
baya) (Akad Teknik 1959)
2. Brig. Gen. Ari Bandiyoko
3. Col. Roestandi A. Moestafa17
(Akad Zeni 1956)
V. Jaya (Greater Jakarta)
1. Lt. Gen. Norman Sasono
2. Maj. Gen. Try Soetrisno36 
(Akad Teknik 1959)
18.1.82 -  20 .IV .83 (15 months) 
Brig. Gen. R. A. Saleh 
Chief of Staff, Kodam VI 
SI ?
20. IV . 83 (2 months)
Chief of Staff, Kodam XVII 
Cavalry S
16.V .81 -  19.IV .83 (23 months)
Brig. Gen. M. Sanif 
Commander, Airborne Combat 
Command, Kostrad 
B/RPKAD J
19. IV. 83 (2 months)
Deputy Governor, General and Army 
Division, Armed Forces' Academy 
Cavalry J
26.1.81 -  7.V .83 (27 months) 
Brig. Gen. Soelarso 
Commander, Kopur I I ,  Kostrad 
SI? J
7.V .83 (2 months)
Chief of Staff, Kostrad 
D J
18.V. 78 -  24.X I I . 82 (55 months) 
Brig. Gen. Obrin Setyakusumah 
Chief of Staff, Kodam XVI 
Engineers J
24.X I I . 82 - 9.V .83 (5 | months) 
Deputy Assistant for Security to 
Army Chief of Staff 
Engineers/B J
9 .V.83 ( 1i months)
Defense Attache, Belgrade 
Engineers S
12 .X .77 -  27.X I I . 82 (62* months) 
Lt. Gen. G. H. Mantik 
Commander, Kodam X II 
CPM J
27.X I I . 82 (6 months)
Commander, Kodam IV 
Engineers J
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V I. Siliwangi (W. Java)
1. Lt. Gen. R. Yogie Suwardi Memet 
(b . May 1929, Cirebon)
2. Maj. Gen. Edy Sudradjat23 
(AMN 1960)
V II.  Diponegoro (C . Java)
1. Lt. Gen. Ismail
(b . December 31, 1927, Maos, 
Banyumas) (Yogya I)
2. Maj. Gen. Soegiarto24
(AMN 1960)
21.X. 78 -  16. IV .83 (54 months)
Maj. Gen. R. Himawan Sutanto 
Commander, Army Paracommando 
Command
SI/RPKAD Cirebonese
16. IV . 83 (2* months)
Commander, Kodam II 
B/RPKAD J
27.1.81 -  7 . IV .83 (26 months) 
Maj. Gen. Sukotjo 
Commander, Kostrad 
D J
7. IV .83 (3 months) 
Commander, Kodam XIV  
D J
V II I .  Brawijaya (E. Java)
1. Maj. Gen. Murgito
(b. January 18, 1928) (P3AD)
2. Maj. Gen. Soelarso27 
(Breda)
IX . Mulawarman (E. Kalimantan) 
1. Brig. Gen. Henry Santoso
2. Col. I Gde Awet Sara2 
(Akad Teknik 1959)
X . Lambung Mangkurat (S. and
1. Brig. Gen. Harjono Prawirodirdjo 
(Breda)
2. Brig. Gen. Syamsudin35 
(AMN 1960?)
9.V.81 -  19.V.83 (24 months)
Lt. Gen. Witarmin 
Commander, Kodam IX 
B J
19.V.83 (1* months)
First Assistant (Security) to Army 
Chief of Staff 
D J
19.V.81 -  5.V .83 (23* months) 
Brig. Gen. Murgito 
Commander, Korem 084 (Surabaya) 
B J
5.V.83 (3 months)
Defense Attache, Kuala Lumpur 
Engineers Balinese
Kalimantan)
18. V. 81 - 29.X I I . 82 (19* months) 
Brig. Gen. Sudiman Saleh 
Commander, Army Cavalry Center 
B/Cavalry J
29.X I1 .82 (6 months)
Chief of Staff, Kodam XVII 
? ?
C.
X II.  Tanjungpura (W. Kalimantan)
1. Brig. Gen. Untung Sridadi 
Tjokrowidjojo 
(Breda)
22 .I I I . 80 -  30.X I I . 82 (33 months) 
Brig. Gen. M. Sanif 
Chief of Staff, Kostrad 
D J
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2. Brig. Gen. Ida Bagus Sudjana21 
(AMN 1960)
X II I .  Merdeka (N. and N .E . Sulawesi)
1. Brig. Gen. Drs. Susanto 
Wismoyo 
(Breda)
2. Col. Adolf Sahala Rajagukguk1** 
(AMN 1961)
X IV . Hasanuddin (S. and S.E. Sulawesi)
1. Maj. Gen. Soegiarto
(b. June 2, 1936, Karanganyar, 
Kebuman) (AMN 1960)
2. Brig. Gen. Soetedjo33
(AMN 1961)
XV. Pattimura (Maluku)
1. Brig. Gen. Sebastian Soekoso 
(P3AD)
2. Brig. Gen. Hasudungan 
Simandjuntak19 
(AMN 1960)
X V I. Udayana (Nusatenggara)
1. Maj. Gen. Dading Kalbuadi 
(P3AD)
2. Brig. Gen. R. P. D. Sutarto32
X V II. Cendrawasih (Irian Jaya)
1. Brig. Gen. Chalimi Imam Santosa 
(b. c. 1930-31) (P3AD)
30.XI 1.82 (6 months)
Chief of Staff, Kostrad 
? Balinese
28.1.81 -  30.V.83 (28 months)
Brig. Gen. Rudini
Deputy Governor, General and Army 
Division, Armed Forces' Academy 
Cavalry J
30.V .83 (1 month)
Chief of Staff, Kodam X III 
D Toba Batak
19.V .79 -  13.IV .83 (47 months) 
Brig. Gen. Kusnadi 
Chief of Staff, Kodam III 
D J
13. IV. 83 (2 i months)
Chief of Staff, Combat Command 
(Kopur) I I ,  Kostrad 
SI/RPKAD J
24.IV .81 -  17.V.83 (25 months)
Brig. Gen. Bagus Sumitro 
Commander, Airborne Paracommando 
Training Center 
RPKAD J
17.V.83 (1£ months)
Commander, Infantry Training
Center, Army Research, Develop­
ment and Training Command 
? Toba Batak
14 .X .78 -  18.V.83 (55 months) 
Brig. Gen. Soeweno 
Commander, Defense Territory of 
East Timor
RPKAD J
18.V.83 (H  months)
?
SI J
8 .V I I . 78 -  14.V I .82 (47 months) 
Brig. Gen. Imam Munandar 
Chief of Staff, Kodam X 
RPKAD J
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2. Brig. Gen. Raja Kami Sembiring 
Meliala18 
(AMN 1960)
14.V I .82 (£ month)
Chief of Staff, Kodam X III 
RPKAD Karo Batak
Head, State Intelligence Coordination Board (Bakin)
Gen. Yoga Sugama39 28.1.74 (113 months)
Lt. Gen. Sutopo Juwono 
Deputy Ambassador to the UN 
D J
Biographies
1. Ari Bandiyoko
68- 70 Major. Commander, Yon Zipur 5, Kodam 8, based at Kepanjen, Malang.
70-71 Seskoad.
? -82 Deputy Assistant for Security to the Army Chief of Staff.
82- 83 Commander, Kodam 4.
83- Assistant-1 (Security), to the Army Chief of Staff.
2. Awet Sara, I Gde 
b. 3 .I I I .  1936, Bali.
59 Graduated from Army Technical Academy (Engineers) in Bandung.
62 First Lieutenant. Deputy Company Commander, RPKAD.
65-70 Captain, then Major. Company Commander, AMN Cadets' Regiment.
66 Succeeded Rudini as Head of Sections 1-2 (Intelligence-Operations) of
the AMN Cadets' Regiment.
70-73 Major, then Lieut.-Col. Deputy Commander, Yon Zipur 1, Kodam 2.
73 Commander, Combined Operations Coordinating Center Indonesia/ 
Malaysia (Sarawak).
73-75 Lieut.-Col. Commander, Kodim 1207, Kodam 12.
75-78 L ieut.-C ol., then Colonel. Assistant-1 (Security), Kodam 12.
78-83 Defense Attache, Kuala Lumpur.
83- Brig. Gen. Commander, Kodam 9.
Graduate of Seskoad and Lemhannas. Fluent in French and English.
3. Bambang Triantoro
b. 7.1.1931, Surabaya.
37-47 Educated through junior high school in Surabaya.
48-50 Finished SMA in Bandung while serving in Army as Second Lieutenant.
50-58 First Lieutenant, then Captain. Instructor and Training Officer at 
Army Ordnance School in Jakarta.
57 Trained at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, for 9 months.
59-63 Major. Served in Ordnance branch of Army in Jakarta.
64-69 Lieut.-Col. Chief of Operations and Training Division, Army Ordnance 
Center, Jakarta.
67 Attended Seskoad, Class 4.
69- 72 Colonel. Served as Executive Officer, Operations Division, Army HQ
in Jakarta.
72-73 Deputy Assistant-2 (Operations) to the Army Chief of Staff.
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79-81 Maj. Gen. Commander, Seskoad.
81-83 Lt. Gen. Commander-General, Kobangdiklat.
83- Deputy Army Chief of Staff.
Speaks some English and some Dutch.
4. Darsoyo
55 Graduated from Dutch Military Academy (Breda).
? -83 Brig. Gen. Deputy Assistant for Politics, Strategy, and General 
Planning, Dept, of Defense and Security.
83- Assistant-5 (Research and Development) to the Army Chief of Staff.
5. Harjono Prawirodirdjo 
b. 1929, Malang.
55 Graduated from Dutch Military Academy (Breda).
72-73 Commander, Indonesian contingent to UN forces in Middle East.
Attended Seskoad. Attended Defense Course at Ft. Knox, USA. Cavalry man
6. Harsudiyono Hartas 
b. 1935, Jepara.
60 Graduated from AMN, Class 1.
? -71 Major (Cavalry). Deputy Commander, First Cavalry Battalion, Kostrad 
72 Attended Seskoad
75 Attended Seskogab.
? -83 Brig. Gen. Deputy Commander, Akabri, General and Army Division. 
83- Commander, Kodam 2.
7. Ishak Odang
77
? -83 Brig. Gen. Head of Sekumad.
83 Head, Army General Supply Service.
83- Assistant-4 (Logistics) to the Army Chief of Staff.
8. Kahpi Suriadiredja
b. 14.V I . 1931, Bandung
Early 50s attended Dutch Naval Academy in Den Helder.
56 Joined Marines (KKO) on his return.
64 Captain. Commander, Amphibious Battalion (KKO).
? -69 Lieut.-Col. Commander, Naval Academy Cadets' Regiment.
69-? Chief of Staff, Marines' Education and Training Center.
70 Studied in the United States.
? Commander, Brigade 52 (KKO).
? Head, Navy Provost-Marshal Corps.
? -77 Chief of Staff, Marine Corps.
77-83 Maj. Gen. Commander, Marine Corps.
83- Commander, Kowilhan IV , in Biak.
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9. Muntaram
b. c. 1935, Cianjur.
58 Graduated from Naval Academy, Surabaya.
65 Captain (KKO). Commander, Naval Academy Cadets' Corps.
c. 73 Served in Garuda IV team to Vietnam.
? Head, Military Police, Kowilhan I.
75 Studied at Seskogab.
79-? Head, Provost-Marshal Corps, Navy.
81 Studied at Lemhannas.
? -83 Chief of Staff, Marine Corps.
83- Maj. Gen. (KKO). Commander of the Marine Corps.
Has had amphibious training in the US.
10. Murdani, Leonardus Benjamin
b. 2 .X . 1932, Cepu. Son of R. G. Murdani Sosrodirdjo, a railway employee, 
and a Catholic Eurasian mother. Raised in Solo, though did not complete high 
school till 1957 (in Bandung).
51- 52 Trained at P3AD (with Soekoso, Kalbuadi, Santoso, and Soeweno).
52 Instructor for embryo RPKAD (Korps Komando AD/KKAD).
52- 54 Instructor, Infantry Cadre School, Bandung.
54- 55 Instructor, Commando School, Batujajar.
55- 56 Chief Instructor, Commando School, Batujajar.
56- 57 Company commander, RPKAD, in action vs. D I/T I I ,  W. Java.
58 First Lieutenant. Led RPKAD unit in assault on Permesta forces in
Menado.
59 Took Company Officer Course, Bandung.
60-61 Took Amphibious Training Course, at Amphibious Training Command, 
Little Creek, Norfolk, V a ., USA.
62- 63 Captain, then Major. Commander, Battalion 530/Para, Kostrad. Led
"Operasi Naga" infiltration of Dutch positions around Merauke.
63- 64 Commander, newly formed Battalion I/RPKAD.
64 Operations Officer, RPKAD.
65 On Operations Staff, Kostrad.
65-? Assistant-1 (Intelligence) Kopur, Kostrad.
67-71 Lieut.-Col. Liaison Officer, Kuala Lumpur.
71-74 Charge d'affaires, Seoul.
74 Headed Satgas, Kopkamtib.
74- Maj. Gen. G-1 (Intelligence), Dept, of Defense and Security.
77- Head, Strategic Intelligence Center, Dept, of Defense and Security.
78- Lt. Gen. Deputy Head of Bakin.
83- General. Commander-in-Chief, Armed Forces and Commander of 
Kopkamtib.
Catholic.
11. Narundana, Nana
b. c. 1936, Tasikmalaya.
60 Graduated from AMN, Class 1 (Cavalry).
? Chief of Staff, Korem 021, Kodam 2, in Pematang Siantar.
? Assistant-2 (Operations), Kodam 2.
? Commander, Korem 022, Kodam 2, in Padang Sidempuan.
? Deputy Commander, Army Center for Territorial Development, in
Bandung.
126
79- 83 Chief of Staff, Kodam 17.
83- Brig. Gen. Commander, Kodam 1.
12. Poniman, S.
b. 18.Vli.1926, Surakarta. MULO education in colonial times.
44 Japanese military training at Bogor (Kanbu Kyoiku Tai, Cadre Training 
Corps).
44- 45 Company Commander (shodancho), Peta, at Cimahi.
45- 50 Company Commander, Battalion "A," Siliwangi Division.
51-5? Captain, then Major. Commander, Battalion 322, Kodam 6.
57-5? Chief of Staff, Regiment 11, Siliwangi Division.
62-64 Colonel. Commander, Korem 061, Kodam 6, in Bogor.
64 Studied at Seskoad.
64-66 Chief of Staff, Kodam 3.
66-68 Brig. Gen. Commander, Kodam 3.
68-70 Commander, Kodam 15
70-73 Maj. Gen. Commander, Kodam 5.
73-77 Lt. Gen. Commander, Kowilhan I.
77-80 Deputy Army Chief of Staff.
80- 83 General. Army Chief of Staff.
83- Minister of Defense and Security.
13. Prajitno
55 Probably graduated from Dutch Military Academy (Breda).
? -72 Colonel. Commander, Second Field Artillery Regiment.
72-? Assistant-1 (Intelligence), Kostrad.
83- Brig. Gen. Assistant-2 (Operations) to the Army Chief of Staff.
14. Rajagukguk, Adolf Sahala
b. 31.X I I . 1938, Medan.
61 Graduated from AMN, Class 2.
? Platoon Commander in Battalion 605, Kodam 10.
? Company Commander in Battalion 604, Kodam 13.
? Company Commander, Cadets' Regiment, Akabri.
? Deputy Commander, Headquarters Detachment, Kodam 13.
? Commander, Battalion 711, Kodam 13.
? Taught at Seskoad.
? Commander, Brigade 6, Kodam 7 and Kostrad.
? -82 Commander, Korem 164 [Dili, E. Timor], Kodam 16.
82- 83 Colonel. Chief of Staff, Kodam 13.
83- Colonel, then Brig. Gen. Commander, Kodam 13.
Attended Army Staff College in England 1972-73; has taken Kupaltu and 
Suslapa. Fluent in English, Batak, and Javanese.
15. Romly, Mohammad
b. 8 .X I I . 1928, Tulungagung. Early education under Dutch colonial regime 
and Japanese.
46- 50 In naval section of People's Security Body (BKR Laut) and successor
organizations; fought on land, in Java.
54 Got initial regular naval training, in Marines' school.
? -64 Lieut.-Col. (Acting?) Chief of the Fleet.
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64- 65 Personnel Officer (Pa A-3) to the Fleet.
65- 66 Colonel. Operations Officer to the Fleet, and Assistant-2 (Operations)
to the Mandala Siaga (Confrontation) Strategic Command.
67 Studied at Seskoal.
68-70 Commodore. Director of General Planning, Navy.
70-? Assistant-5 (Communications and Electronics) to the Navy Chief of 
Staff.
11-11 Rear Admiral. Governor, Akabri, Navy Division.
7?-78 Vice-Admiral. Deputy Navy Chief of Staff.
78-82 Chief of Operations Staff, Dept, of Defense and Security.
82- Navy Chief of Staff.
16. Rudini
b. 15.X II. 1929, Malang, third of ten children of R. Ismangun Puspohandojo, 
of Yogyakarta.
50 Graduated from SMA. Platoon commander in Brawijaya Division.
55 Graduated from Dutch Military Academy at Breda.
55- 59 Training officer with, later Commander of,Battalion 518, Kodam 8, in
Malang.
59-66 Attached to AMN as instructor; then Company Commander, Cadets' 
Regiment; then Assistant 1-2 ( intelligence/Operations) to this 
Regiment.
66 Studied at Lemhannas.
66-67 Major. Attached to Battalion 401/Para, Kodam 7 and Kostrad, in 
Srondol (Lieut.-Col. Untung's old u n it).
68-70 Lieut.-Col. Commander, Battalion 401/Para.
70-72 Chief of Staff, Airborne Brigade 18/Kostrad, in Jember.
72- 74 Commander, Airborne Brigade 18.
73- 74 Colonel. Commander of Indonesian contingent to UN forces in Middle
East.
74- 76 Chief of Staff, Kopur Linud, Kostrad.
76- 77 Commander, Kopur Linud, Kostrad.
77- 78 Brig. Gen. Chief of Staff, Kostrad.
78- 81 Commander, Kodam 13.
81-83 Maj. Gen., later Lt. Gen. Commander of Kostrad.
83- Lt. Gen., then General. Army Chief of Staff.
Married in 1959. Fluent Dutch and English, passive German.
17. Roestandi A. Moestafa
b. 20.V I I . 1933, Bandung.
56(?) Graduated from the Army Engineers' Academy in Bandung.
56- 57 Platoon commander in Yon Zipur in T T /V II (E. Indonesia)
5?- Deputy Commander, Detachment 1, Yon Zipur "A," in Kendari.
62 Served in Indonesian contingent to UN forces in the Congo (Garuda
V I I I ) .
68-72 Commander, Yon Zipur 2, Kodam 6.
72-75 Assistant-2 (Operations), Kodam 12.
75- 78 Operations officer attached to the Dept, of Defense and Security.
78-83 Defense Attache in Belgrade.
83- Colonel. Commander, Kodam 4.
Has studied at Seskoad, Seskogab, and Lemhannas. Fluent in Dutch and 
English, passive in French.
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18. Sembiring Meliala, Raja Kami
60 Graduated from AMN, Class 1.
69- Captain. Succeeded Soetedjo as Commander of the Special Warfare
Detachment of the Paratroop Training Center.
? Deputy Commander, Airborne Special Warfare Training Center (Pusdik
Sandha/Linud).
? Instructor at Seskoad.
? Commander, First Infantry Brigade ("Jaya Sakti"), Kodam 5 and
Kostrad.
? Personal Secretary to the Army Chief of Staff.
? Assistant-2 (Operations), Kostrad.
? Commander, Indonesian contingent to UN forces in Middle East.
79 Commander, Regimental Combat Team 18, in "Operasi Seroja" in East
Timor.
79-82 Chief of Staff, Kodam 13.
82- Brig. Gen. Commander, Kodam 17.
Fluent in English and German.
19. Simandjuntak, Hasudungan
60 Graduated from AMN, Class 1.
? Assistant-2 (Operations), Kodam 5.
? -83 Commander, Infantry Training Center (Pussenif) in Bandung.
83- Brig. Gen. Commander, Kodam 15.
20. Sudiman Saleh
b. June 5, 1928, Yogya.
55 Graduated from Dutch Military Academy (Breda).
? Was at one time Commander of Indonesian contingent to UN forces in
Middle East.
70 Attended General Staff and Command College, Ft. Leavenworth.
79-81 Brig. Gen. Commander, Kodam 10.
81- 83 Maj. Gen. Governor, General and Army Division, Akabri.
83- Assistant-3 (Personnel) to the Army Chief of Staff.
21. Sudjana, Ida Bagus
60 Graduated from AMN, Class 1.
? Commander, Korem 121, Kodam 12 in Sintang.
81 Top marks for written work, regular course, Lemhannas.
? -82 Chief of Staff, Kostrad.
82- Brig. Gen. Commander, Kodam 12.
22. Sudjarwo, Anton
b. 21. IX . 1930, Bandung.
52 Graduated from senior high school in Magelang.
54 Attended the Police Academy in Sukabumi.
54-56 IP. Police chief in Palopo.
56 Adjutant to National Police Chief Sukanto Tjokrodiatmodjo.
56- 57 Head of Traffic Police, Makasar.
57- 58 AKP. Attached to Foreign Relations Section of Police Headquarters'
Organization Bureau.
59-61 Company Commander in Brimob.
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60 Took "Ranger" training in Porong.
61 Took infantry training in the US.
62- 64 Commander, Battalion 1232/Vanguard (Pelopor) in Brimob.
62 Led unit infiltrating Irian Barat.
64-72 AKBP. Commander, Vanguard Regiment, Brimob.
68 Attended Police Staff College in Lembang.
69 Passed "jumpmaster" (paratroop) course at Sukasari.
69-72 Also headed Security Command for Tanjung Priok and Pasar Ikan.
72- 74 KBP. Commander, Kores 102, Kodak 10, in Malang.
74- ? Commander, Komapta.
? Commander, Kodak 11 (West Kalimantan).
? -78 Commander, Kodak 2 (N. Sumatra).
78-82 Brig. Gen. Pol., then Maj. Gen. Pol. Commander, Kodak 7 (Greater 
Jakarta).
82- Lt. Gen. Pol. Head of National Police.
23. Sudradjat, Edy
60 Graduated from AMN, Class 1.
61-63 Platoon Commander in Battalion 513, Kodam 8, in Jember.
66-? Operations officer, Battalion 1/RPKAD in Jakarta.
71 Studied at Seskoad.
71- 73 Deputy Assistant-1 ( Intelligence), Kopassandha, Jakarta.
73- 75 Commander, Group IV RPKAD in Jakarta.
75 Studied at Seskogab.
75- 78 Commander, Infantry Training Center in Bandung.
78-79 Chief of Staff, East Timor Task Force, Dept, of Defense and Security.
80 Studied at Lemhannas.
80- 81 Brig. Gen. Commander, Kopur Linud, Kostrad, in Jakarta.
81- 83 Commander, Kodam 2.
83- Maj. Gen. Commander, Kodam 6.
24. Soegiarto
b. 2 .V I. 1936, Karanganyar, Kebumen.
60 Graduated from AMN, Class 1.
72- 73 Commander, Battalion 401/Para, Kodam 7 and Kostrad in Srondol.
76- 77 Commander, Akabri Cadets' Regiment.
77- 78 Commander, Indonesian contingent to UN forces in Middle East.
78- 79 Chief of Staff, Kodam 3.
79- 83 Brig. Gen., then Maj. Gen. Commander, Kodam 14.
83- Commander, Kodam 7.
Has been through Advanced Officers' Training Course-ll; Seskoad; and 
Seskogab.
25. Sukardi
b. December 1931, Bojonegoro.
51 Graduated from high school.
52 Entered Flying School.
54-58 Fighter pilot, Husein Sastranegara air base, Bandung.
58-60 Flight Instructor, Squadron I I ,  Halim air base, Jakarta.
60-63 Flight Instructor, Training Wing 001, Adisucipto air base, Yogya- 
karta.
63- 65 Major. Commander, Squadron I I ,  Operations Wing 001 at Halim air base,
Jakarta.
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65- 66 Assistant Director, Foreign Supplies, A ir Force HQ.
66- 67 Head, Bureau of Purchasing and Materiel Supply, A ir Force HQ.
68-70 Colonel. Commander, Halim air base, Jakarta.
70-73 Commodore. Commander, Kodau 7, Maluku and Irian Barat.
73-75 Commander, Kodau 5, Jakarta.
75-77 First A ir Marshal. Assistant for Operations, Dept, of Defense and 
Security.
77-81 Deputy Commander, Kowilhan II.
81- 82 Air Vice-Marshal. Commander, Kostranas.
82- Air Force Chief of Staff.
26. Soekoso, Sebastian
51-52 Trained at P3AD (with Murdani, Kalbuadi, Santoso, Soeweno).
56- Lieutenant. Arrested by subordinates in RPKAD during the "Lubis 
A ffa ir."
? -66 Major. Head of Section-2 (Operations), Brigade 3/Para.
66-67 Commander, Battalion l/RPKAD, succeeding C. I. Santoso (q .v . ) .  
67 ? Commander, newly-formed Croup l/RPKAD.
? -81 Commander, Airborne Paratroop Training Center.
81-83 Brig. Gen. Commander, Kodam 15.
83- Commander-General, Army Research, Development and Training
Command.
Catholic.
27. Soelarso
Young brother of General Surjo (?).  In Revolution fought with Djatikusumo's 
Ronggolawe Division, in north-central Java.
55 Graduated from Dutch Military Academy in Breda.
55-? Platoon commander in Battalion 437, Kodam 7.
62? Adjutant to Gen. A. H. Nasution as Armed Forces' Chief of Staff.
69 Studied at Seskoad.
75 Studied at Lemhannas.
77?-79 Deputy Assistant-1 (Security) to the Army Chief of Staff.
79-81 Brig. Gen. Commander, Kodam 3.
81-83 Maj. Gen. Assistant-1 (Security) to the Army Chief of Staff.
83- Commander, Kodam 8.
28. Sumitro, Bagus
49 Graduated from Yogya Military Academy, Class 2.
? -69 Lieut.-Col. Assistant-6 (Functional Group A ffairs), Kodam 17.
69- 70 Assistant-5 (Territorial A ffairs), Kodam 17.
70- ? Colonel. Commander, Korem 163 in Bali.
? -78 Attached to Lemhannas.
78-81 Brig. Gen. Commander, Kodam 15.
81- Maj. Gen. Commander, Seskoad.
29. Supardjo
b. 21.V I I I . 1929, Nganjuk.
55 Graduated from Dutch Military Academy in Breda.
55-57 Deputy Commander, Battalion 318, T T / I I I ,  in Ciamis.
57-? Commander, Battalion 318, Kodam 6.
67 Studied at Seskoad.
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69 Lieut.-Col. Chief of Staff, Kodam 12.
70 Went for training in the US.
71?-74 Colonel, then Brig. Gen. Deputy Commander, Joint Services' Staff and 
Command Education Institute.
74-76 Commander, Kodam 10.
76 Went for further training in the US.
76-83 Assistant-5 (Research and Planning) to the Army Chief of Staff.
81-83 Maj. Gen. Doubled as Assistant for Logistics, Dept, of Defense and 
Security; perhaps also Assistant for Planning and Budgeting.
83- Lt. Gen. Commander, Kowilhan I I I .
30. Suripto
b. 18.11.1934.
60 Graduated from AMN, Class 1.
60-63 Second Lieutenant. Platoon Commander in Kodam 7.
64 First Lieutenant. Company Commander in Cadets' Regiment,AMN.
65 Took Kupaltu.
65-68 First Lieutenant, then Captain. Acting Deputy Commander of Battalion 
203, Kodam 5, in Jakarta.
68 Took Suslapa.
69 Acting Operations Officer, First Infantry Brigade, Kostrad, in Jakarta.
70-? Major. Commander, Battalion 202, Kodam 5.
11-12 Commander, Kodim 0502, Kodam 5 in C. S N. Jakarta.
73? Lieut.-Col. Attended Seskoad.
74-77 Assistant-1 (Security), Kodam 17.
75 Attended Seskogab.
77- 78 Deputy Head, Army Information Service.
78- 81 Colonel. Assistant-1 (Security), Kodam 6.
81- 82 Assistant-1 (Security), Kowilhan I.
82- 83 Chief of Staff, Kodam 12.
82- 83 Brig. Gen. Chief of Staff, Kostrad.
83- Commander, Kodam 3.
31. Susilo Sudarman
b. 10.X I . 1928, Cilacap.
48 Graduated from Yogya Military Academy, Class 1.
48-49 Instructor at the Academy, and Operations Officer, Sub-Wehrkreise 
104, Yogyakarta.
50- 51 Assistant-1, Bureau of Training, Ministry of Defense.
51- 52 Attached to Bureau II ,  Joint Staff, Armed Forces' Staff.
52- 53 Attached to SUAD-II, Army HQ.
53- 54 Inspectorate Officer, Cavalry, Bandung.
54- 55 Bureau of Education, Cavalry Training Center, Bandung.
55- 56 Instructor, SSKAD, Bandung.
56- 58 Chief of Section II (Operations), Cavalry HQ, Bandung.
58-59 Commander, Cavalry School, Bandung.
58-60 Commander, Cavalry Sqd. Battalions l / l l / l l l ,  Kodam 6, in Padalarang. 
60-61 Head of Tactical Department, Cavalry HQ, Bandung.
65-67 Lieut.-Col. Commander, Military Academy Cadets' Regiment.
67- 68 Colonel. Commander, Cadet Division, Akabri.
68- 70 Brig. Gen. Deputy Governor, Akabri, General and Army Division. 
70-73 Defense Attache, Washington, D .C .
73-75 Maj. Gen. Head of G-3 (Personnel), Dept, of Defense and Security.
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75- 78 Assistant for Personnel and Manpower Development, Dept, of Defense
and Security.
78- 80 Maj. Gen., then Lt. Gen. Commander-General, Akabri.
80- Commander, Kowilhan I.
32. Sutarto, R. P. D.
? Army Cadre School (? ).
54 Company Commander in Battalion 309/Kodam 6.
67-69 Major. Commander, Battalion 330/Kujang I, Kodam 6 and Kostrad.
Cited as one of few non-RPKAD to pass freefall jumpmaster course 
at Batujajar.
68 Took Suslapa.
69 Led Battalion 330 in operations against PGRS/Paraku in W. Kalimantan. 
70-73? Lieut.-Col. Chief of Staff, First Infantry Brigade, Kodam 5 and
Kostrad, in Jakarta.
73-? Commander, First Infantry Brigade.
? -79 Assistant-2 (Operations), Kodam 5.
79- ? Unspecified function in Army HQ (probably intelligence).
83- Brig. Gen. Commander, Kodam 16.
33. Soetedjo
b. 28.V I I . 1937, Cilacap.
61 Graduated from AMN, Class 2. (Had completed SMA B in Cilacap pre­
viously.)
61-64 Platoon and Company Commander, Battalion 131, Kodam 3.
65-? Company Commander in Battalion 2/RPKAD.
? -69 Captain. Commander, Code Detachment (? Dan Sandha), Special 
Forces/Paratroop Training Center.
69-? Assistant for Research and Development at this center.
? -76 Commander, Croup IV , Kopassandha.
76- 80? L ieut.-C ol., then Colonel. Commander, Infantry Brigade 12, Kodam 6,
in Cianjur.
80- 82 Assistant-2 (Operations), Kodam 6.
82- 83 Chief of Staff, Kopur II ,  Kostrad.
83- Brig. Gen. Commander, Kodam 14.
Fought against Kahar Muzakar in 64-65 under Yusuf.
34. Soeweno
b. c. 1929, in Madiun. In later Revolution fought in TRIP (E. Java) and 
TP (C . Java).
51-52? Trained at P3AD (with Murdani, Soekoso, Kalbuadi, Santoso).
53-63 Served in RPKAD.
63- 64 Major. Trained abroad.
64- 67 Commander, Battalion 2/RPKAD, in C. Java.
67 Married daughter of Brig. Gen. Kusen.
67-? Commander, Group 11/RPKAD.
? -76 Colonel. Commander, Special Forces/Paracommando/Airborne Training 
Center at Batujajar.
76-78 Brig. Gen. Commander, Kodam 16.
78-81 Assistant-2 (Operations) to the Army Chief of Staff.
79 Headed Joint Task Force for "Operasi Seroja" in E. Timor.
83- Maj. Gen. Commander, Kostrad.
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35. Syamsudin
60? Graduated from AMN, Class 1?
? -73 Major. Chief of Staff, Kodim 0803, Kodam 8, in Madiun.
73- ? Sent to serve with Garuda V contingent to ICCS supervising ceasefire
in Vietnam.
?-82 Chief of Staff, Kodam 17.
81- 82 Studied at War College in the US.
82- Brig. Gen. Commander, Kodam 10.
36. T ry  Soetrisno
b. 15.X I . 1935, Surabaya.
56- 59 Trained at Army Technical Academy in Bandung.
60-62 Platoon commander in Yon Zipur 2, in Palembang.
68- 70 Captain. Deputy Commander, Yon Zipur 9/Para, in Bandung.
70-71 Captain, then Major. Commander of Amphibious Yon Zipur 10, in Pasuruan. 
71 Studied at Seskoad.
74- 78 Adjutant to the President.
78- 79 Chief of Staff, Kodam 16.
79- 82 Brig. Gen., then Maj. Gen. Commander, Kodam 4.
82- Commander, Kodam 5.
37. Untung Sridadi Tjokrowidjojo
55 Graduated from Dutch Military Academy in Breda.
57- 64 Instructor at AMN, rising from Second Lieutenant to Major.
? Educated successively at the Yugoslav Army Staff and Command School;
Lemhannas, Class 10; Defense Management Course in the US.
64-69 Lieut.-Col. Commander, Battalion 410, Kodam 7, in Blora.
69- ? Commander, Kodim 0733, Kodam 7, in Semarang City.
7?-? Commander, Fourth Infantry Brigade, Kodam 7 and Kostrad, in Slawi. 
7?-? Commander, Kopur Linud, Kostrad.
73? Commander, Indonesian contingent to UN forces in Middle East.
? -80 Chief of S taff, Kostrad.
80- 82 Brig. Gen. Commander, Kodam 12.
82- 83 Inspector-General of the Army.
83- Maj. Gen. Governor, Akabri, General and Army Division.
38. Wismoyo Aris Munandar 
b. 10.11.1940.
63 Graduated from AMN, Class 3.
Has attended Seskoad and Seskogab.
66 Attached to special Military Police Task Force (Satgas Pomad) which 
guarded the President (Suharto?) in early days of the New Order.
81 Played key role in "Operasi Woyla"—recapture of hijacked Garuda 
airplane at Bangkok.
? -83 Colonel. Commander, Group IV/RPKAD/Kopassandha, in Serang.
83- Colonel, then Brig. Gen. Commander, Kopassandha.
Married to Ibu Tien Suharto's younger sister.
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39. Yoga Sugama
b. 12.V. 1925, Tegai. During the Japanese Occupation attended the Rikugun 
Shikan Gakko (Japanese Military Academy) in Japan.
48 Returned to Indonesia.
48- 49 Intelligence officer with the Banyumas Military Command.
49- 50 Intelligence officer with the Gunung Jati Regiment, C. Java.
52-53? Received intelligence training at Maresfield, England.
55-59 Major. Assistant-1 (Intelligence), T T /IV  (C . Java) under Suharto.
59-? Lieut.-Col. Commander, Regimental Combat Team (R T P )-II, in W. 
Sumatra.
62 Deputy Assistant-2 (Operations) to the Army Chief of Staff, in charge 
of training military attaches.
62-65 Military Attache in Belgrade.
65- 66 Assistant-1 (Intelligence), Kostrad under Suharto.
66- 67 Brig. Gen. G-1 (Intelligence), Dept, of Defense and Security.
67- ? Personal Assistant (Aspri) to the President in charge of intelligence
and security.
67-68 Deputy Head of Bakin.
69- 70 Head of Bakin.
70- 7? Head of G-1, Dept, of Defense and Security.
72-74 Maj. Gen. Deputy Head of the Indonesian Mission to the UN.
74- Lt. Gen., then General. Head of Bakin.
40. Yogie S. (Suwardi) Memet, R. 
b. May 1929, Cirebon.
62 Captain. Deputy Commander, Battalion 330/Kujang I/Para 
(attached both to Kodam 6 and Kostrad).
65 Major. Commander, Battalion 330 (succeeding Himawan Sutanto).
Hero of Operasi Kilat vs. Kahar Muzakar.
67-68 Lieut.-Col. Commander of Kodim 0618, Kodam 6, in Bandung City.
69- 70 Chief of Staff, Brigade 17 Airborne/Kujang, Kostrad.
70 Top marks in 7th class of Seskoad course.
70- 72? Colonel. Commander, Brigade 15, Kodam 6, in Bogor.
73 Deputy Commander, Kopassandha.
7?-75 Commander, Kopur Linud, Kostrad.
75- 83 Brig. Gen. Commander, Army Paratroop Command.
78-83 Maj. Gen., then Lt. Gen. Commander, Kodam 6.
83- Commander, Kowilhan II.
